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Abstract
This paper provides a theoretical dual-channel model of optimal taxation to
analyze the tax treatment on electronic commerce. The model characterized
by the endogeneity of decisions about selling channel is a four-stage game.
The results suggest first that dual-channel structure is not socially optimal in
a monopoly or duopoly. However, if it historically happened, then the prefer-
ential tax on electronic commerce would be desirable as long as consumption
externalities exist.
Keywords: electronic commerce; network externality; optimal taxation; sales
tax
1. Introduction
Despite the heated debates over taxation of electronic commerce, most of
the existing literature has focused on legal or administrative issues. The
few conceptual discussions are lack of systematic analyses in a framework of
optimal taxation. One exception is Bruce et al. (2003), who examine the
question of whether or not to tax electronic commerce based on considera-
tions of efficiency, equity, administration and compliance, and revenue. They
conclude that generally the optimal tax literature cannot be used in support
of a blanket tax exemption for Internet purchases.
It is admitted that the optimal tax theory does not consider the differ-
ential taxation problem in the context of trading forms. Bruce et al. (2003)
treat the goods bought via two different channels as two separate goods,
based on the difference of transaction cost. However, while the substitution
between electronic and tradition purchasing channels for buyers has been
considered in their paper, the possibility for producers facing a specific tax
structure to switch the selling channels has never been addressed.
In this paper we propose a theoretical foundation of optimal taxation to
analyze the tax treatment on electronic commerce. We consider the existence
of two selling channels consisting of an electronic channel and a traditional
channel. Of course, the heart of our analyses is the endogenous decision of
selling channel. The optimal taxation on electronic commerce is investigated
respectively under two market structures: monopoly and duopoly. Electronic
commerce brings consumers network externalities. In the model of duopoly,
consumers are assumed to be heterogeneous in the preference for brands
of which the products might be sold in different channels. The model also
considers some distinguishing factors of electronic commerce, like consumers’
virtual acceptance and lower transaction cost.
2. The model
2.1 Monopoly market structure
Consider a manufacturer who sells a product to a market of 2n identical
consumers. The manufacturer may distribute the product to either or both
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of shopping channels. Assume that each consumer derives utility from the
consumption of the commodity and buys at most one unit. Let v be the basic
utility gained from consuming the product that is bought through an oﬄine
store. When the product is bought online through virtual inspection, it is as-
sumed to have smaller value αv, where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. It is also assumed that the
consumption through online trade exhibits network externalities. Moreover,
the consumption externalities increase with the numbers of consumers. Let p
and q denote the price and the number of buyers respectively. A commodity
tax is levied on the good, and the taxation is ad valorem with tax rate t. The
consumer surplus of each consumer is given by se = αv − (1 + te)pe + θqe, if
good is bought through electronic channel, and sr = v− (1+ tr)pr, if good is
bought through traditional channel, where the subscripts e and r represent
electronic and traditional channels respectively, and θ stands for consumers’
preference for consumption externalities.
The monopolist has two decisions in a sequential manner. Firstly, the
manufacturer decides selling channel, and then he chooses a price which
maximizes his profits. For simplicity, assume that there is no fixed cost of
production. Let ce and cr be marginal costs incurred by the manufacturer for
the product sold through the electronic and traditional channels. Normally,
it is expected that ce < cr.
The decisions of all agents in the model can be divided into four stages.
In the first stage, the government sets the commodity tax rates to maximize
social welfare. In the second and third stages, selling channel and pricing
are decided by the manufacturer. In the fourth stage, consumers make their
purchasing decisions. In the following, we solve this game backward.
Let us first consider consumers’ purchasing decisions. If each consumer
obtains more surplus from the purchase through electronic channel, then the
total demands faced by the monopolist are qe = 2n and qr = 0. Subject
to consumers’ demand function, the monopoly’s profit maximizing price and
his associated profit are
pe =
αv + 2nθ
1 + te
, (1)
pie = 2n(
αv + 2nθ
1 + te
− ce). (2)
If sr > se, then qr = 2n and qe = 0. The monopoly’s maximizing profit price
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and the corresponding profit are as follows:
pr =
v
1 + tr
, (3)
pir = 2n(
v
1 + tr
− cr). (4)
If se = sr, then the monopolist could sell the commodity through dual chan-
nels and the prices pe and pr are determined as follows:
max pi = (pe − ce)qe + (pr − cr)(2n− qe)
s.t. αv − (1 + te)pe + θqe = v − (1 + tr)pr. (5)
It can be shown that selling through a single channel rather than dual chan-
nels is the best choice for the monopolist.
Let’s turn to the monopolist’s marketing decision. In this stage, the
monopolist decides which channel to sell the product. The result is that the
monopolist will sell the product through electronic channel if and only if
cr − ce > (1 + te)v − (1 + tr)(αv + 2nθ)
(1 + te)(1 + tr)
. (6)
Before proceeding to optimal tax policy, we answer an important ques-
tion at this point, that is whether the monopolist’s decisions of marketing and
pricing are socially optimal. Define social welfare as the sum of consumers’
surplus, the monopolist’s profit and tax revenues. Thus, social welfares under
the two situations of single selling channel are given by
We = 2n(αv + 2nθ − ce), (7)
Wr = 2n(v − cr). (8)
Suppose that there are dual selling channels, then social welfare is
W = (αv + θqe − ce)qe + (v − cr)(2n− qe). (9)
It is easily shown that from the viewpoint of social welfare, the optimal qe
is equal to 2n. With regard to the two selling channels, the comparisons
of social welfare indicate that electronic commerce is more desirable than
traditional trading if and only if cr − ce > (1− α)v − 2nθ.
The desirability of selling channel selected by the monopolist and the
associated welfare under each tax regime are summarized in the following
proposition:
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Proposition 1. (i) Under the regime of no commodity tax, the selling chan-
nel selected by the monopolist is optimal. And the social welfare in equi-
librium is maximal. (ii) Under the regime of neutral taxation, the selling
channel is optimal if and only if cr − ce > (1 − α)v − 2nθ or cr − ce <
((1 − α)v − 2nθ)/(1 + t). Once the selling channel is optimal, the social
welfare in equilibrium is maximal. (iii) Under the regime of tax exemp-
tion of electronic commerce, the selling channel is optimal if and only if
cr− ce > (1−α)v−2nθ or cr− ce < v/(1+ tr)− (αv+2nθ). Once the selling
channel is optimal, the social welfare in equilibrium is maximal.
2.2 Duopoly with heterogeneous consumers
Consider a duopoly industry producing two brands A and B. Consumers
have different preference toward the two brands. Suppose that 2n potential
consumers distribute uniformly between [0, 1] according to their preference
toward brands. A consumer’s location in the preference spectrum is indexed
by z ∈ [0, 1], that is the distance from brand A. If she buys brand A, then
she has disutility of δz, where δ can be thought of as the disutility per unit of
deviation of buying brand from what she prefers most. On the contrary, her
disutility of buying brand B is δ(1 − z). Thus, the total cost of purchase is
composed of after-tax price of the product and disutility of buying a specific
brand.
Case 1: sAe > s
A
r and s
B
e > s
B
r
In this case, all consumers want to purchase the commodity through elec-
tronic channel. The location of the consumer who is indifferent between the
two brands is the point ze such that
ze =
δ + (1 + te)(p
A
e − pBe )
2δ
, (10)
where the superscripts A and B of variables denote the respective brand.
Firm A’s demand equals 2nze when ze ∈ [0, 1], 2n when ze > 1, and 0
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when ze < 0. Thus we have
qAe =

0 if (1 + te)p
A
e > (1 + te)p
B
e + δ
n
δ
(δ + (1 + te)(p
B
e − pAe )) if (1 + te)pAe ∈ [(1 + te)pBe − δ, (1 + te)pBe + δ]
2n if (1 + te)p
A
e < (1 + te)p
B
e − δ
By the symmetry, the demand function of firm B could also be derived.
Solving the maximization problem of firm i, i = A,B, we obtain his response
function b(p−ie ). In any Nash equilibrium, b(p
−i
e ) = p
i
e, i = A,B. Thus, the
equilibrium prices are
pie =
1
3
(
3δ
1 + te
+ 2cie + c
−i
e ), i = A,B. (11)
Substituting the equilibrium prices into the equations of qie, i = A,B, we have
qie = n(1 +
(1 + te)(c
−i
e − cie)
3δ
), i = A,B. (12)
The profit of firm i is
piie =
n
9δ(1 + te)
(3δ + (1 + te)(c
−i
e − cie))2. (13)
In this case, the consumer who is indifferent between brand A and B
has a preference for brands defined by
ze =
δ + (1 + te)(c
B
e − cAe )
2δ
. (14)
The aggregate surpluses for both types of consumers are therefore given by
2n
∫ ze
0
sAe dz and 2n
∫ 1
ze
sBe dz. The tax revenue from electronic commerce is
2nte(p
A
e ze + p
B
e (1− ze)). In aggregate, the social welfare is
We = 2n[(αv + 2nθ − δ
2
)− cAe ze − cBe (1− ze) + δze(1− ze)]. (15)
Case 2: sAr > s
A
e and s
B
r > s
B
e
Each consumer, irrespective of her preference for commodity brand, want to
purchase oﬄine in this case. The consumer who is indifferent to buy brand
A or B is characterized by
zr =
1
2
[δ + (1 + tr)(p
B
r − pAr )]. (16)
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Given a pair of prices (pAr , p
B
r ), the market demand for each brand can be
derived. The Bertrand equilibrium of the four-stage game is further solved,
which are characterized by equilibrium prices, quantities and profits as equa-
tions (11)-(13) show, except that the tax rate te, and the marginal costs of
the two firms cAe and c
B
e , are replaced by tr, c
A
r , and c
B
r respectively. The
consumers surpluses from buying brand A and B can be further derived,
based on 2n
∫ zr
0
sAr dz and 2n
∫ 1
zr
sBr dz. And the social welfare is given by
Wr = 2n[(v − δ
4
)− 1
2
(cAr + c
B
r ) +
(1 + tr)(5− tr)
36δ
(cBr − cAr )2]. (17)
Case 3: sAe > s
A
r and s
B
r > s
B
e
In this case, the marginal consumer is located at zd, where
zd =
1
2(δ − nθ)((α− 1)v + δ + (1 + tr)p
B
r − (1 + te)pAe ). (18)
All the consumers with brand preference in the interval [0, zd] buy brand A
online, otherwise they buy brand B oﬄine. Demands for brand A and B are
thus
qAe =

0 if PAe > P
B
r + δ + (α− 1)v
n
δ−nθ (δ + (α− 1)v + (PBr − PAe )) if PAe ∈ [PBr − δ + (α− 1)v + 2nθ,
PBr + δ + (α− 1)v]
2n if PAe < P
B
r − δ + (α− 1)v + 2nθ
qBr =

0 if PBr > P
A
e + δ + (1− α)v − 2nθ
n
δ−nθ (δ + (1− α)v − 2nθ − (PBr − PAe )) if PBr ∈ [PAe − δ + (1− α)v,
PAe + δ + (1− α)v − 2nθ]
2n if PBr < P
A
e − δ + (1− α)v
where PAe and P
B
r are after-tax prices of the two brands.
The Bertrand equilibrium before-tax prices are given respectively by
pAe =
1
3(1 + te)
((α− 1)v + 3δ − 2nθ + 2(1 + te)cAe + (1 + tr)cBr ), (19)
pBr =
1
3(1 + tr)
((1− α)v + 3δ − 4nθ + 2(1 + tr)cBr + (1 + te)cAe ). (20)
It follows that the optimal outputs are, respectively,
qAe =
1
3(δ − nθ)((α− 1)v + 3δ − 2nθ − (1 + te)c
A
e + (1 + tr)c
B
r ), (21)
qBr =
1
3(δ − nθ)((1− α)v + 3δ − 4nθ − (1 + tr)c
B
r + (1 + te)c
A
e ). (22)
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The corresponding profits are
piAe =
n((α− 1)v + 3δ − 2nθ − (1 + te)cAe + (1 + tr)cBr )2
9(δ − nθ)(1 + te) , (23)
piBr =
n((1− α)v + 3δ − 4nθ − (1 + tr)cBr + (1 + te)cAe )2
9(δ − nθ)(1 + tr) . (24)
The social welfare is given by
Wd = 2n[v − δ
2
− cBr + ((α− 1)v − cAe + cBr + δ)zd + (2nθ − δ)z2d], (25)
where
zd =
(α− 1)v + 3δ − 2nθ − (1 + te)cAe + (1 + tr)cBr )
6(δ − nθ) .
Next turn to the decision of selling channels. Since the results are too
complicated to give explicit self-selection conditions, we focus on the special
case in which there is no commodity tax and costs are identical for both firms
regardless of selling channels. According to the self-selection constraints for
both firms, we show that with no tax and no cost difference, both firms will
never sell product through different channels.
Proposition 2. Suppose that ti = 0, and c
A
i = c
B
i = ci, i = e, r. Then
(a)in the duopoly market with Bertrand competition, only single selling chan-
nel, either electronic or traditional, exists;
(b)when both firms sell through the same channel, piAe = pi
B
e = pi
A
r = pi
B
r = nδ.
From the viewpoint of social planner, which kind of channel structure is
desirable? In the first two cases of single channel, the optimal segmentation
of consumers and the associated social welfare are derived as follows:
z∗e =
1
2δ
(δ + cBe − cAe ), (26)
W ∗e =
n
2δ
[(cBe − cAe )2 − 2δ(cAe + cBe ) + δ(−δ + 4αv + 8nθ)], (27)
z∗r =
1
2δ
(δ + cBr − cAr ), (28)
W ∗r =
n
2δ
[(cBr − cAr )2 − 2δ(cAr + cBr ) + δ(−δ + 4v)]. (29)
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Suppose that both firms are equally efficient. Comparing equation (29) with
(27) yields that electronic selling is socially preferred if cr − ce > (1− α)v −
2nθ(≡ u); otherwise, traditional selling is optimal.
In the dual-channel case, the optimal division of market and the associ-
ated social welfare are obtained as follows:
z∗d =
1
2(δ − 2nθ)(δ + (α− 1)v + c
B
r − cAe ), (30)
W ∗d =
n
2
[4(v − cBr )− 2δ +
(cBr − cAe )2 + (α− 1)v + δ)2
δ − 2nθ ]. (31)
Comparing equation (31) with (29) and (31) with (27) yields
W ∗d > W
∗
e if and only if cr − ce < (1− α)v + δ − 4nθ − (2δ(δ − 2nθ))1/2
≡ u1,
W ∗d > W
∗
r if and only if cr − ce > (1− α)v − δ + (δ(δ − 2nθ))1/2 ≡ u2.
Since u1 < u < u2, there are four kinds of relations among W
∗
e , W
∗
r , and W
∗
d :
(i)cr − ce > u2 : W ∗e > W ∗d > W ∗r ; (ii)u < cr − ce ≤ u2 : W ∗e > W ∗r > W ∗d ;
(iii)u1 < cr − ce ≤ u : W ∗r > W ∗e > W ∗d ; (iv)cr − ce ≤ u1 : W ∗r > W ∗d > W ∗e .
The comparison results reveal that it is also undesirable for the whole society
to trade in a dual-channel, symmetric duopoly market with no tax.
Proposition 3. Suppose that ti = 0, and c
A
i = c
B
i = ci, i = e, r. Then
(a)single channel is always preferred to dual channels;
(b)the single electronic channel is preferred to the single traditional channel
if and only if cr − ce > (1− α)v − 2nθ.
It is apparent that in a symmetric duopoly market with no tax distortion,
the choice of selling channel made by both firms noncooperatively coincide
with the social optimal one.
3. Optimal tax policy
3.1 Taxation under monopoly
Assume that the tax revenue required is T ∗. First, consider the situation
under which the monopolist sells product in electronic channel. The govern-
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ment maximizes the sum of (pie+ se), subject to the constraint T ≥ T ∗. The
optimal tax in an electronic market is
t∗e =
T ∗
2n(αv + 2nθ)− T ∗ . (32)
Similarly, for the traditional trade, the optimal tax rate is given by
t∗r =
T ∗
2nv − T ∗ . (33)
Proposition 4. In a monopoly market, to raise the same amount of tax
revenue, the tax rate under the regime of single channel is lower for electronic
commerce than for traditional trade if and only if the product value from
consumption is higher in the former case. The optimal tax on electronic
commerce is negatively correlated with the value of consumption externalities
for consumers.
3.2 Taxation under duopoly
For simplicity, the analysis in the following will confine to the case where
all tax revenues are returned to consumers as a lump-sum. It shows that
the optimal commodity tax under single channel is exactly equal to 2, no
matter what channel the product is sold through. In a single channel with
the optimal tax, Bertrand competition leads to maximum of social welfare.
Proposition 5. In a duopoly market, the optimal tax rate under each single
regime is constant and equal 2, if the tax revenue is rebated as a lump-sum.
Under a dual-channel regime, it is surprising that the two tax rates
should keep a positive linear relationship in order to attain the maximum of
welfare. That is te = [(c
A
e − cBr + (1−α)v)(2δ− nθ) + nθ(4nθ− 5δ) + cBr (δ−
2nθ)tr]/c
A
e (δ − 2nθ).
To capture the whole picture, we adopt the method of numerical simu-
lation. First, the parameters and variables of demand and supply are set as
follows: n = 100, v = 1, α = 0.9, δ = 0.1, cAe = 0.15, and c
B
r = 0.25. Since
the preference for consumption externalities has negative influence on the op-
timal te, other things being equal, we simulate two cases with different values
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of θ. In the first case, where θ is set to be 0.0001, if tr is in (0, 0.23), then
the optimal value of te is negative. The first column of Table 1 shows one
of the simulated results in which the two types of trading have differentiated
tax treatment, and the net revenue for government is positive.
In the second case, the preference parameter θ is equal 0.00012. From
equation of te, we learn that if tr is set in (0, 0.285), then te should be set
to be negative. Selecting a pair of optimal tax (subsidy) rates (te, tr) =
(−0.06, 0.25) such that the net tax revenue is equal to the amount in the
first case, the equilibria of this four-stage game are simulated and presented
in the second column of Table 1.
In these two cases, traditional trades are taxed, while electronic trades
are subsidized. The net and the gross prices in traditional channel are higher
than those in electronic channel. The market share of brand A is more than
60%. Firm A who sells product through electronic channel earns more profit
than firm B who is in traditional channel. On average, the consumer surplus
per capita in electronic channel is slightly higher than that in traditional
channel. Finally, as consumers’ preference for consumption externalities gets
stronger, to obtain the same amount of net tax revenue, the unit subsidy on
electronic commerce and the unit tax on traditional trade both should be
raised up. The overall social welfare improves to some extent.
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we provide a framework to examine optimal taxation on elec-
tronic commerce to remedy inadequacy of existing conceptual discussions.
Especially, we take explicitly producer’s decision on dual channels, a virtual
channel and a real channel, into account.
We show that single channel is socially preferred to dual channels in
either a monopoly or a duopoly market. However, with tax enforcement,
producer’s choice of selling channel generally is inappropriate. Regarding
the tax treatment, we find that in a monopoly market, electronic commerce
should be given preferential tax under single regime. In a duopoly market
with Bertrand competition and single channel, the optimal tax is neutral.
Finally, under dual-channel regime in a symmetric duopoly, electronic com-
merce should be subsidized, while traditional trade is taxed.
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This study is a solid step toward assessing tax policy on electronic com-
merce in a systematic approach. A number of extensions might be considered
however. For example, consumption risks and the enforcement costs may
have important role in sales tax policy.
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TABLE 1
Simulation results of optimal taxation, market equilibria
and welfare: dual-channel duopoly
case 1: θ = 0.0001 case 2: θ = 0.00012 no externality
electronic traditional electronic traditional electronic traditional
t -0.05 0.20 -0.06 0.25 0.065 0.039
p 0.268 0.306 0.273 0.298 0.244 0.260
P 0.255 0.368 0.257 0.373 0.346 0.360
q 125 75 132 68 100 100
S 78.281 46.031 82.389 41.762 61.532 61.532
pi 14.803 4.219 16.214 3.298 9.394 9.627
T 2.916 2.916 2.916
Wd 146.250 146.579 145
zd 0.623 0.658 0.5
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